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Shabtai Rosenne 
If international law is conceived as a 
standard-setting regulatory pattern for 
the nonnal conduct of states towards 
one another, the question of interna-
tional law and the use of force--of the 
relationship between law in force--
belongs not to its static parts, but rather 
to a more dynamic and, truth to tell, 
less clearly rcgulated area. Here the 
essential problem is to balance the 
dictates of a civilizing, outward-looking, 
standard-selling agency with the over-
riding introspective requirements of 
national security and self-defense. That 
is the real problem which force and the 
threat or use of force pose for interna-
tional law. It is, moreover, the intrac-
table nature of that conflict which leads 
many to the mistaken view that when 
reduced to fundamentals, international 
law is either unimportant or, at best, 
belongs to the category of moral stan-
dards and not those of law in the sense 
of imperativcs. This dilemma is similar 
to that referred to ill a recent article in 
the New Yorker (7 Sl!ptemlH:r 19GB) Oil 
the trial of Dr. Spock where the fol/ow-
ing selltcncc appl~ar:::; "The ca~ was 
simply too palpably cntwincd with con-
troversial political issues--with the ques-
tion of dove versus hawk-for its legal 
form and its social eonten~ to bc sepa-
rahle." That sentcnce also uLlers the 
words of caution agaillst the banality 
which is all too frequcnt in legal and 
political science literature dealing with 
the vexed problem of force. I·'or it can 
be taken for granted that no responsible 
government will lightly decide on the 
employmcnt of armed force, and it is 
thc height of irresponsibility to ap-
proach the legal system with platitudes 
on the evils of force. Moreovl:r, the 
dilemma of the hawk vcrsus the dove is 
not confined to anyone country or to 
anyone period of time. Insofar as 
intcmaLional law gives expression to 
certain social experiences and, in the 
view of many, to certain essen tial re-
quirements of the civilized world, it, 
too, has to face this dilemllla. 
[n the history of international law 
sevcral phases can hc observed ill its 
approach to the problelll of force. Cer-
tain aspects which are taken for granted 
today were not always so, just as today 
we face new problems for which therc is 
little historic experience to guide us. 
But running through all this history is 
the persistent attempt to halance the 
legitimate requiremcnts of national 
defcnse and security and the equally 
legitimate requircllll!nts of the civilized 
world which regards the indiscriminate 
usc of force with distaste and seeks to 
place it hcyond the pale not merely of 
the law, hut of normal internatiolla[ 
rclations. 
The first stage ill tempering the rigors 
of the usc of force and subjecting it to 
legal restraint goes hack to quite all 
early period of civilization. This rdatcs 
to the protection of the noncomhatant, 
whether civilian or the sick and wound--
cd Illi[itary. Traccs of this type of 
humanitarian legal regulation can be 
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found in the Bible, in the teachings of 
the church fathcrs and in comparable 
works of olher civilizations. They find. 
forlllal expression today in the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949. Although this 
humanitarian aspect is peripheral to the 
een Lral problem, the history of this 
humanitarian law is inLeresting bccause 
it can illustrate the ccntral problcm of 
our thcmc. That branch of the law has 
as its assumption that it is possible to 
make a elear and a logical distinction 
between the combatant and the non-
combatant. But the experiences of 
modem Lotal wars·-whether they arc 
World Wars or wheLher Lhey arc lo-
calized wars--east scriuus doubts on the 
validity or the assumpLion. If that is so, 
as regards what is no more than a 
segment of the problem, it follows that 
the central problem itself is also colored 
by the same eharacteristie_ For many 
smaller peoples, loss of a war may mean 
Lhe loss of naLional independence, or at 
least a fundamental change of the na-
Lional destiny in to new directions im-
[losed by the vicLors. It is the naLural 
unwillingness of peoples to submit for-
cibly to such changes which makes the 
problem of the legal regulaLion of the 
usc of force one of such delicacy and 
difficulty, and which makes it, in the 
words of the New Yorker so "impos-
sible for its legal form and its social 
content to be separable." 
It may he an oversimplification to 
state that the topic helongs to the 
dynamic area of internaLional law. IL 
concems the dynamics of human intcr-
course and of in ternational relations in 
gencral. It is relatively easy to draw up a 
legal text such as the Charter of the 
United Nations and refer to respect for 
the territorial intehrrity or political inde-
pendence of any state. The assumption 
of these texts is that the very concep-
tions of "territorial integrity" and "po-
litical independence" when applied to 
concrete situations are inherently static 
and immutable. It may hc true that, in 
general, law is by nature inclined 
towards the maintenance of stahility. 
But the relaLionships with which we arc 
dealing arc themselves not static, and 
the consccration of stability in the 
words of a text may end up by being 
mere platitudes. A complicated variety 
of factors converges to make changes, 
and particularly territorial changes, al-
most inevitable. Many of the situaLions 
of conflict existing in the worhl today 
can be traced Lo causes of Lhis kind, just 
as in other parts of the world siLuaLions 
of Lranquillity or relalive tranquillity are 
explained precisely by the absence of 
these factors for rapid and forceful 
change_ 
Does this mean that no reconciliation 
at all is possible between law and force? 
It is doubtful if a negative answer is 
justified_ The experience of the present 
century seems to be showing the way in 
wh ieh a reconeiliaLion could be 
achieved. 
InLelleeLual and in formed pacifi$m, 
as opposed to purely ellloLion:ll, illeo-
logical, and dogmalic pacifist 1l10Vt~­
menLs, has in thc last hundred ycars 
looked in two directions as it ap-
proaches towards the creation of an 
international order which, when it is 
constructed, will contain built-in clc-
ments enabling it to cope with Lhe 
inherent dynamism of international rela-
tions. The first is the search after 
acceptable international machineries for 
facilitating the necessary changes in the 
international status quo, the so-called 
problem of "peaceful change." The 
second is the attempt to regulate the usc 
of force itself by a mixture of polilical 
machinery and legal controls. 
If each of Lhese approaehe$ must he 
treated separately as a matter of system-
atic presentation, in fact as well as in 
intellectual conception, they arc in-
separable. Indeed, in their modcrn bruise 
the two approaches brrew out of a single 
intellectual endeavor, being the reaction 
of a small woup of farsighted men--
lawyers, statesmen, and officers of Lhe 
armed forccs--who were able to ob:1erve 
in the year 1f170 on the one hand the 
two major contincntall·:uropean powers 
tl~arin~ thclII::1dvcs to pieecs in a short 
but devastating war, and the two leading 
English-speaking powers, themselves on 
the verge of war, pulling back at the last 
moment and settling their differences 
by arhitration_ The Franco-Prussian War 
and the A labumu arbitration took place 
almost silllulLaneously. 
The approach to the regulaLion of 
peaceful change startcd with the idea 
that apart from the secondary, ami, in a 
way, technical aspects of improving the 
actual formulation of intemational law 
(a process which, .by the way, has 
produced very significant results during 
the last 20 years in the specialized area 
of codification of international law 
with, indeed, a highly sophisticated 
mechanism for this process), new inter-
nationalized institutions to substitute 
themselves for the individual wills of the 
1'00'I·rt·i~IIS in dl'alin~ with this typl\ of 
::;ituation mu::;t he (·::;tablished mill made 
operational. Apparently on the basis of 
what was thought to be the lesson of 
the organic social development which 
led to the creation of the modern state 
as we now know it, what was looked for 
was a way to centralize the control of 
force in the intemational area, much in 
the same way that inside each state 
private forcc is not allowed, and all 
controlled force is theoretically depen-
dent upon the government. This was 
paralleled with the creation of new or 
improved international machineries for 
peaceful change and dispute settlement. 
These machineries fall into two general 
p:ILLerns: namely, thoSI\ whose functions 
arc es::;entially limited to factfinding 
(the theory being that in many cases the 
impartial establishment of controverted 
facls may itself lead to the settlement of 
Ilisputcs), and those aiming at the crea-
tion of more far-reaching regulatory 
mechanisms involving particularly 
machineries for conciliation and media-
tion and machincries for arbitration and 
even int('rnational judicial settlement--
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corresponding to some extent in pmc-
Lice, thou~h not Iwees::;arily in theory, 
to the political role perfornwd by the 
national legislature inside the states. 
Regardless of technical and character-
istic differences between these different 
institutions, their underlying approach 
is the same: namely, that the parties in 
dispute should have to lay their cards on 
the table, clarify their objectives, and 
leave it to third parties to find the 
reconciliation, whether by mere persua-
sion or by more compulsive means. 
Experience has shown that in pro-
ducing these machineries, for which 
some of the forms of internal state 
organization were taken, their essential 
substance could not easily be trans-
ferred into the international area, main-
ly because of the tremendous impact of 
national sovereignty and the concept of 
the sovereign equality of states. In all 
modern states the central authority has 
at its disposal force which can be used, 
and is used, both to prevent breaehcs of 
the law and to enforce decisions of the 
dispute-settlement organs inside the 
state. This is the manifestation, on the 
internal plane, of the concept of "sov-
ercignty," and this has its international 
parallels too. In normal cases this works 
without much diffieulLy. The police in a 
criminal case and the bailiffs or the 
sheriffs in a civil case exist to ensure 
that the adjudged person carried out 
what he is supposcd to do. Yet, in 
complicated situations with dcep politi-
cal and social overLoncs this system does 
not work so well. This can be illustrated 
by reference to two areas of social 
conflict frequently involving the lise of 
force, with which the modern sLate 
system is showing itself increasingly 
unable to cope on the basis of tradi-
tional patterns. The first is the area of 
labor relations, and the other is the area 
of race relations. In both of these areas 
of confliet--as well as in others--legal and 
t r ad i t i onal governmental processes, 
while they may have immediate effi-
cacy. rarely are able to get to grips with 
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the root causes of the tensions and by 
their failure to do this produce a kind of 
chain reaction in thc form of contempt 
and frusLration Lowards the law enforce-
ment and cven the lawmaking processes, 
if not towards society iLself. 
These two particular areas of social 
tensions arc close to the type of interna-
tional tensions which endanger peace; 
and if the relatively closely integrated 
national societies are engaged in deep 
heart searching to find appropriate ways 
of handling thesc tensions and removing 
their explosive potentialities, how much 
greater are the differences in the un-
cohesive inLernational community. 
The second approach has turned 
more directly to the problem of force 
itself. It was at one time thought, for 
instance, that disarmament hy itself 
would go a long way towards providing 
an answer to the problem, but disarma-
ment was not effective between the two 
World Wars, possibly because it took the 
symptom for the cause, and the interna-
tional debate on disarmament did not 
touch the roots of the suspicions and 
fears which have made the massive 
armament of nations so commonplace 
today. 
At the same time the international 
community has been groping towards a 
form of organization which will supply 
political machineries to deal with the 
situaLions of tension and maintain inter-
national peace. This international effort 
today is epitomized by the United 
NaLions. This is, in iLs external trap-
pings, a highly sophisticaLed interna-
tional administrative machinery, but in 
substance it is not very different from 
Lhe morc discreet sysLem of preserving 
international peace of the Concert of 
Europe. The underlying theory in each 
case--and herein lies one explanation for 
the so-called right of veto in the Se-
curity Council today-is that the big 
powers, in fact and not merely in 
theory, bear the primary responsibility 
for the maintenance of international 
peace. This theory worked well enough 
so long as the big powers were able to 
regulate their own relations between 
themselves. If it has not been effective 
since 1918, this is mainly because tllllY 
have not been successful in regulating to 
the fullest extent their own relations. 
In thc hrrowth of this systcm the 
formal tex ts are now based on Lhe 
proposition that war, as a matter of 
national policy, is renounced. In what-
ever form the proposiLion is to ue 
framed, whether as in the Briand-Kel-
logg Pact of 192B, which now exisLs in 
reviscd language in articlc 2, paragraph 4 
of the U.N. Charter, or in the form of 
the so-called Stimson I )oclcine of non-
recognition of territorial changes 
brought about by the illegal use of 
force, or in the so-called Litvinov for-
mula of nonaggression, the proposition 
is one which will hardly stand up to 
critical analysis; furthermore, the super-
ficial attraction of the slogan-like lan-
guage blinds the unwary to the unreality 
of the proposition. It depends far too 
much on interpretation which, except 
when you have agreed intcrprcLaLion, is 
at uest a highly controversial exercise 
and at worst no more than a decoy for a 
naked political power sLruggle. 
Tcxts of this kind-perhaps stating 
the obvious-explicitly rescrve what the 
United Nations Charter calls the in-
hcrellt right of self-defense against 
armed attack. The formulas used vary, 
but their purpose remains the same. The 
idea is that in principle the aggressive 
use of force is renounced as an instru-
ment of national policy, but that if, in 
spite of this ban, anoLher staLe employs 
forcc, its victim is legally entitled Lo 
defcnd iLsclf until the organizctl interna-
tional society takes appropriate mea-
sures to put a stop to Lhc violations of 
peacc. 
In the Charter this system is based on 
three assumpLions, namely: (a) that the 
Security Council--the orgau 011 whieh is 
c{)lIfl~rred primary rcsponsibiliLY for Lhe 
mainLenance of international peae(: and 
sl'l"uriLy--wuuld ha\'(: aL iLs 11i:;posalnon-
JllilillirY and JIIililllry mllchineries of 
cOJllpulsion which il could usc 'l~lIinst 
n'caldlrnnt slale~: (b) that the Security 
Council would have a sufficiently united 
sense of purpose in the discharge of its 
primary responsillilily, that it would lle 
prepared to usc these machineries 
through the devil:es of nonmilitary or 
military sanetiom; when faced with 
threatened or actual breaches of interna-
tional peace and security; and (c) that 
the Security Council would be objec-
tively capable of determining when an 
unlawful breach of the peace has oc-
curred. Sidc by side with the Security 
Council there exists au all Imt defunct 
Military Staff Committee (which, in 
faet, has nevcr met except on formal or 
social occasions) whose function, ac-
cording to article 47 of the Charter, is 
to all vise anll assist the Security Council 
on all questions relating to the Council's 
military requirements for the main-
tenance of intemational peace and 
security, the employment and command 
of forces placcd at its disposal, the 
regulation of armamcnts, and possiblc 
disarmament. That is the teeth of the 
theoretical system of collective security 
establish cd at San Francisco in 1945 
with its groping attempt at the centrali-
zation of force on the international 
level. The U.N. Charter, taken simply as 
a text, appears to be a stronger docu-
ment than the League Covenant, pro-
fessing to learn from the failure of 
collective security as coneeived in the 
inlerwar period by comhining political 
procedlm:s for peaceful change wilh 
military proccdures for the main tenancc 
of peacc. 
Taking the Charter as a lcgal text, 
attention may be called to two major 
and in terconncclcd problcms of inter-
pretation for which the solution is still 
elusive. The two notions requiring defi-
nition and interpretation are the central 
oncs of "aggression" and of "force." 
The main problem of the definition 
of force is whether it should be limited 
to arJIIllll force (which, of course, is 
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fairly_ easily identifiable), or whl!lher, 
for till: purpo~es of constructing an 
ade"quatc mOll ern interlllliional ordl'r, 
Ihe concept is now a broader one 
altogether, including such intangillie ele-
ments as psychological, cconomic and 
political pressures. If therc is a strong 
reaction today, and rightly so, against 
the "gunboat diplomacy" of thc 19th 
century, there is an equally strong rc-
action against its so-callcd "gin-llottlc 
diplomacy"; for the ,,'Tcat colonial em-
pires now disintegrating are said to have 
been established by a sinful combina-
tion of these two methods of cocrcion. 
Most of the countries of the world are 
militarily and economically weak, and if 
the matter is approached simply as one 
of head-counting in international con-
ferences, in which all states participate 
on a footing of formal equality, there is 
little doubt that the majority, indeed 
the overwhelming majority, with memo-
ries of Munich (1938) very much in 
their mind would prefer the broadest 
possible interpretation as including all 
forms of prcssure which one state can 
bring upon another. £n practical terms 
this is obviously quite unreal; just as in 
ordinary human rclations pressures can 
be used quite legitimately, until the fine 
dividing line of the illegal area of undue 
pressure is reached. 
The question of the definition of 
aggression has heen undcr international 
discussion since the late 1920's, al-
though it is actually older and is con-
necteil with treaties of guarantee and of 
nonagl,'Tession. In terms of the discipline 
of thc law, the necessity for a definition 
of this term is now s;id by its propo-
nents to arise from the ohligation of 
members of the League of Nations, or 
today of the United Nations, to come to 
the assistance of the victim of aggression 
within the framework of the concept of 
collective security. It has been said, for 
instance, that a definition of aggression 
would assist the Security Council in its 
work, though this suggestion is un-
doubtedly tendentious. 
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Thcrc is no difficulty over the ob-
vious and hlal.<lIIt ea8es of direct ai!/-,>Te8-
sion, which can em;ily bc ob8crvecl and 
listed. The difficulty ariscs over thc far 
more dangerous and insidious forms of 
indirect ag/-,>Tession deliheratly carricd 
out in a way which enablcs a govern-
ment 10 dcny rcsponsihility for thcm. 
Techniques of this kind werc commonly 
used in Europe as tensions preceding 
World War 11 were building up, and they 
have continued to bc used ever since. 
Words like "Auslandsdeutsche" in the 
Nazi period, "Volunteers" in the Ko-
rean war, or "Fedayeen" or "EI Fatah" 
in the Middle I~ast illustrate this. These 
phenolllena also illustrate in practical 
terms the prohlcm of the so-called 
preventive war and the risks (0 interna-
tional peace and security which arc 
created, if one thinks of defining aggres-
sion in exclusively enumerative terms. 
Such a definition of aggression is ap-
propriate, perhaps, for the identifiable 
instances of direct aggression but quite 
inappropriatc if one takes a broAder 
look at the whole problem of the 
international regulation of the usc of 
force. 
On the whole, the Security Council 
as an organ operating collectively and 
the powers represented on it working 
individually have displayed a marked 
reticence towards formally condemning 
a state as an aggressor, even in quitc 
obvious cases, except where, for some 
fortuitous eireulllstanee, the parliamen-
tary situation was favorable to one 
point of view as in the case of Korea in 
.I une 19;'0, and even then the North 
Korean action was called only a "hreaeh 
of the peace." There arc at least two 
explanations for this. One is the deep 
political eleavage existing among the 
permanent members of the Security 
Council which is responsible for the 
noncreation of international peacekeep-
ing forces at the disposal of the Security 
COllneil sllch as are envisioned in the 
lLN. Charter, and in general for the 
Council to act as planned in the CharLer. 
In the major conlliels which have conw 
hefore the United Nations since 194;', 
the (Jivisions between the major powers, 
derivin~ from the deep clash of inlerests 
in terms of glohal stratehries, have pre-
vented them ever heing at one and 
saying that an act of aggression hm; 
taken place, or that joint and univ('rsal 
action was needed to restore the peace. 
The second is a maller of diplomatic 
tcehnique. If the objcetive is the restora-
tion of peace and the adjustment of a 
situation that has given rise to serious 
tcnsion, pejorative asscrtions that one 
side ~or another had hecn guilty of 
agh>Tession arc not likely to be hdp ful in 
terms of reaching a ~etllemenL. Instead 
of this we find the Security Council 
adopting a more pragmatic approach 
and concerning itself rather with pre-
vcnting the spread of violence and bring-
ing it to an end than with condemning 
states. This has been coupled with the 
virtual ahandonrnent by the Security 
Council of any idea that it could Icgis-
late a new situation into existence. This 
has been left to the parties, the interna-
tional organizations at best providing a 
set of rcconllnended i!uidclincs. In the 
same line of thought, internatio/llIl1y 
controlled and internationally com-
posed military forces have been created 
ad hoc and have operated under the 
United Nations flag, working not under 
the compulsory powers of the Security 
Council hut by agreement of the states 
concerned, something which the lI.N. 
Charter did not foresee. I\lany tlrink 
that ill the long ru n tlris is a morc 
sa ti sf a etory approach towards in-
tractable problems, and one doser to 
intemational realities, than any allclIlp t 
to opcrate the Security Council as 
though it were a kinu of world police-
man intervening automatically to pre-
vent real or threatened breaches of the 
peace and a world legislature dictating 
settlements. 
One of the common techniques to 
cover up the lise of force in forcign 
relations is that of intervention at tire 
invitation of thc rcsponsible authorities 
of an invaded statc. Armcd intl'rvcntion 
is nothing new in international relations, 
it being thc traditional man ncr in which 
strong states imposed thcir wiII on 
weakcr statcs or prcvented the emer-
gcnce in wcaker slatcs of elements • 
hosti"~ to their own polieics. Today, 
under the regimc of the lI.N. Charter, 
intcrvention of this type is hanned. It is 
in order to overcomc that ban that the 
proccll nrc has becn evolved by which a 
govcrnmcnt "invites" some outside 
pOWl'r to scnd in its armccl forces to 
"protcct" it. Somctimes this happcns 
whcn intcrnal turllloil lIIay threatcn the 
internal rcgimc without necessarily Icad-
ing to a change in the general interna-
tional orientation of a state; at others, 
thc internal turmoil may even be pro-
duecd or accompanied by external ele-
ments themselves aiming at producing a 
change in the country's external orienta-
tion. In the first type of case, where the 
international status quo is not really 
threatened, this form of intervention, 
while not commendable, may not al-
ways be open to serious reproach, pro-
vhled the invitation to intervene is real, 
that it leaves thc government in eom-
llland of the situation and is not cxees-
sive, and that it is terminated as soon as 
feasihle. The other type of case, on the 
other hand, will have serious interna-
tional repercussions, possibly of the 
most far-reaching kind. Nevcrthelcss, 
the fact that the intervention is in 
rl:l'ponsc to an apparcntly authoriz(:d 
invitation from some rcsponsible au-
thority may be of purely nominal sig-
nificance. 
The reader may detect in this artiele 
a tone of pessimism, as though the 
lawyer and diplomat are resigning from 
their professions in face of the enor-
mous problems confronting them. But 
such a conelusion would be premature. 
There is no doubt that the international 
society, with all its deep-rooted schisms 
and hcterogeneity, has advanced a long 
way in strengthening the peace-preserv-
7 
in~ mechanisms in comparison with 
what was the position as liLLie as half a 
century ago. Pcrhaps the greatest ad-
vance has becn in the realization that an 
adequate legal order can only be con-
structed on the basis of a realistic 
approach which fully recognizes on the 
onc hand that no self-respecting nation 
will jeopardize its supreme national in-
terests, as it conceives them, on the altar 
of legalism or idealistic perfectionism, 
and on the other that there do exist 
collective interests beside the egoistical 
interests of the individual states. This is 
undoubtedly balanced by the fact that 
thanks to the destructive force of 
modern weapons and the totality of 
modern war the subjective weighing of 
the national interest is a far more 
delicate and profound operation than it 
appears to have been even as late as 
1939. To overcome the present suspi-
cions and fears is a major political task 
which the lawyer is perhaps not the best 
equipped to perform. Indeed, one might 
easily say that just as war is too serious 
a matter to be left to the generals, so is 
the international legal regulation of 
force and its various manifestations too 
serious a matter to be left to the lawyers 
and politicians. The U.N. Charter at-
ternpte~, on the basis of its pragmatic 
approach to the matter, to combine the 
political, economic, legal, and military 
aspects under the aegis of the Security 
Council. For political reasons the origi-
nal scheme has failed, and its replace-
ment has not yet begun to take clear 
shape. But that it can only be based on 
that kind of combination of profes-
sional talents and interests is now 
widely recognized. When that ideal 
situation wiII have becn reached, the 
world will be in a beLLer position to 
provide effective international ma-
chinery for making objective determina-
tions of whether the supreme national 
inlerests are at stake. So long as that 
determination is left to the individual 
subjective appreciation of each state, as 
it now inevitahly is, the matter is going 
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to be left to politicaljudgmcnt with thc 
law following suit. 
In the dcvelopment of the concept of 
collective security, with its concomitant 
of sanctions against the state guilty of 
the breach of the peace, the naval arm 
of the armed forccs occupies a promi-
nent place. !':or many centuries the 
naval forces have formed the main 
instrument by which force has been 
brought to bear (except as far as con-
cerns the immediate Iimitrophe states). 
Furthermore, as a syllabus in the Naval 
War College puts it, naval force provides 
the dynamics for "bilateral as well as 
multilateral and often abrasive confron-
tations between discreet sources of 
power and military force." It is fre-
quently overlooked today that many of 
the details of the concept of sanctions 
as they exist in books about the League 
of Nations and in certain official papers 
of the United Nations have their direct 
inspiration from the economic warfare 
measures applied by the Allied and 
Associated Powers during each of the 
two World Wars, in which the naval 
forces played a key role. The old system 
of prize law, now largely relegated to 
the limbo of naval and legal history 
(where it makes fascinating reading), 
provides the inspiration for much of the 
contemporary conccptions of collective 
applications of sanctions, and even of 
individualized applications of force, in 
exceptional circumstances. The quaran-
tine of Cuba has its historic parallels in 
the Anglo-French economic warfare in 
the Napoleonic wars, in the long-
distance blockade of thc American Civil 
War (thc Alabama arbitration pmviously 
mentioncd was an outgrowth of that), 
and in the e1aboratc controls of all 
seabornc tradc initiated by the Allies in 
1914 and perfectcd in 1940, and in 
post-194.5 controls of the movcment of 
strategic materials from one part of thc 
world to another. 
It is stated in the Naval War College 
syllabus that the naval officer must be 
in a position with sureness and firmncss 
to understand, evaluate, and cffcctivcly 
cxploit Lhc legal advice and counscl 
which he solicits. The naval officer is 
not, of course, the only public servant 
to which that admonition should apply 
(it should certainly apply to the diplo-
mat). If Lhis article has conveyed Lhc 
impression that thcre is littlc firm in the 
legal rules governing the employment of 
force, one may at the salllc time safely 
assume that a rcsponsible govcrnment-
and one cannot legislate for irrespon-
sible governments--will determine the 
limits of the freedom of action of a 
commander in any military or quasi-
military action, and that adroit use of 
modern communications in unforeseen 
situations, in thc context of thc /!:eneral 
humani:t.ing mission of the contempo-
rary intcrnationallaw, wiII provide a fair 
course on which to sail. For in the final 
result, intcrnational law, like all law, is 
common sense writ largc, amI C0ll11110n 
sense couplcd with good faith goes a 
long way towards remedying formal 
deficiencics which thc unsatisfactory 
state of contemporary law exhibits. 
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